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INTRODUCTION
The national debate surrounding the federal government's role in en-
forcing an occupational safety and health program has produced a number
of widely differing views. On the one hand, the government has been accused
of insufficient effort, given the magnitude of the problem; on the other hand,
it has been charged with using an unconstitutional law to bludgeon employers
into making unnecessary expenditures. Actually, the federal government
conceives of its role in administering and enforcing the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 19701 quite differently than either of these two views. The
most apt description of the federal viewpoint is that government is a catalyst-a
catalyst with the expressed desire to achieve a safe and healthful work environ-
ment by voluntary means.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act was designed to bring the re-
sources and commitment of the federal government to bear on the problem
of work-related deaths, injuries, and illnesses. The increasing growth and com-
plexity of modern industry, with its sophisticated work processes and cascade
of new materials, were resulting in the deaths of more than 14,000 workers
and disabling injuries to more than two million others in the years immediately
preceding passage of the Act.2 The magnitude of this tragedy can be seen by
comparing the employment-related mortality rate with that of the U.S. forces
in Vietnam. During the two years preceding the Act's passage, the number of
workplace deaths was more than twice that of battlefield fatalities. In addi-
tion to the needless human suffering involved, this workplace toll constituted
a significant drain on the resources of the country. Lost wages exceeded $1.5
billion a year and the total workmen's compensation cost to employers was
$4.82 billion in 1970 alone. 3
By the middle of the last decade it was apparent that the efforts of those
concerned with this problem-state legislatures, industry and its safety spe-
cialists, and labor unions-had not decreased the workplace toll. Historically,
safety and health legislation had been left to the states, but their response was
uneven. A few states, notably New York, Pennsylvania, and California, had
adequate job safety laws. Many others either had legislation which covered
only particular industries or had devoted insufficient resources to the situation.
*Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Labor.
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
2 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS (1972).
3 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
1 (1972).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Some safety inspectors were chosen for political allegiance rather than pro-
fessional experience. Occupational health was often misunderstood or ignored
completely. Even where effective state regulation was attempted, it was neces-
sarily limited by state boundaries. When Pennsylvania banned the manufacture,
use, and storage of the chemical betanaphthylamine, an extremely hazardous
substance linked with cancer of the bladder, the manufacturer moved its plant
to Georgia, which did not then regulate the chemical. Industry's response
was similarly ineffectual. Many large manufacturers had developed programs
designed to create employee awareness of safe work habits while minimizing
administrative or engineering control of the hazards. Few of these programs
even considered the deleterious effects of toxic substances, partly because
of the long studies necessary to prove a correlation between a substance and
its effect on those exposed to it.
The legislative history of the Act reflects these previous failures as well
as a congressional desire for a multifaceted approach to the problem. In Senate
discussions of the bill, Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. of New Jersey,
sponsor of the bill, stated:
Although many employers in all industries have demonstrated an exemplary
degree of concern for health and safety in the workplace, their efforts are too
often undercut by those who are not so concerned. Moreover, the fact is that
many employers-particularly smaller ones-simply cannot make the neces-
sary investment in health and safety, and survive competitively, unless all are
compelled to do so. The competitive disadvantage of the more conscientious
employer is especially evident where there is a long period between exposure
to a hazard and manifestation of an illness. In such instances, a particular em-
ployer has no economic incentive to invest in current precautions, not even in
the reductions of workmen's compensation costs, because he will seldom have
to pay for the consequences of his own neglect.
Nor has state regulation proven sufficient to the need. No one has seriously
disputed that only a relatively few States have modern laws relating to occupa-
tional health and safety and have devoted adequate resources to their administra-
tion and enforcement. Moreover, in a State-by-State approach, the efforts
of the more vigorous states are inevitably undermined by the shortsightedness
of others.
In sum, the chemical and physical hazards which characterize modern in-
dustry are not the problem of a single employer, a single industry, nor a single
state jurisdiction. The spread of industry and the mobility of the workforce
combine to make the health and safety of the worker truly a national concern. 4
In the House of Representatives, Congressman William A. Steiger, of
Wisconsin expressed the intent of the legislation he sponsored (which was
combined with the Williams bill to create the Act):
One of the primary purposes of the bill is to set up a mechanism by which
fair and effective occupational safety and health standards can be promulgated
so that the many employers and employees throughout the Nation may be
guided in their attempts to establish and maintain safe and healthful work
environments.
The conference reported bill is clearly based on the premise of this House
4 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG.,
1ST SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, at
413 (Comm. Print 1971).
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that it is with the cooperation of both employers and employees that the Act
can most effectively meet the challenge of reducing and perhaps eliminating
most of the occupational deaths, tragic injuries, and diseases which take a large
annual toll in terms of the human suffering and loss to the economy caused by
these tragedies.5
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACT
The Act, which is administered by the U.S. Department of Labor's Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), not only provides for strong
enforcement authority, but also emphasizes improving the work environment
by a combination of voluntary compliance, research, training, and education.
6
OSHA thus has an obligation to stimulate awareness not only of workplace
deaths, injuries, and illnesses, but of solutions to those problems. This obligation
has been translated into a workable program in the administration of the Act.
The thrust of that program was presented by President Nixon in a report
to Congress in May, 1972.
Like many problems that we face today, the improvement of job safety
and health cannot be accomplished by simply pressing a button. If we are to
reduce the injuries, the illnesses, and the deaths connected with working con-
ditions we must increase the number of people who are trained in health and
safety techniques; knowledge of the cause of accidents and illness must be
developed; this knowledge must be translated into effective standards; employers
and employees require adequate instructions; and standards must be enforced
through energetic and rigorous inspection programs.
Above all else, if we are to be successful, the full collaboration of private
industry, the States, and the employee must be enlisted.7
The federal government's attempt to act as a catalyst8 for the various sectors
of society in the task of reducing workplace tragedies is apparent in the manner
in which the major mandates of the Act have been administered.
A. Adoption of Standards
The Act directed OSHA to promulgate by rule as its own standards any
existing national consensus standards and any established federal standards,
51d. at 1216.
6 The law is prefaced as follows:
An Act to assure safe and healthful working conditions for working men and women;
by authorizing enforcement of the standards developed under the Act; by assisting and
encouraging the States in their efforts to assure safe and healthful working conditions;
by providing for research, information, education, and training in the field of occupational
safety and health; and for other purposes.
Congress declared its intention to preserve the country's human resources by encouraging
private efforts and voluntary measures. Section 2 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970), places initial
emphasis upon actions by employers and employees to implement safety practices and procedures
which are currently recognized in the industry and which are continually being developed by
the private and public sectors. Further, OSHA is vested with the authority to set and enforce
mandatory occupational safety and health standards. Other provisions of the Act serve to stimulate
activities to preserve safety and health.
7 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 3, at iii.
' OSHA's organizational structure reflects this role. An Office of Training and Education,
an Office of State Plan Review and Evaluation, and a Division of Voluntary Compliance Program-
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except those already covered under other legislation in such fields as mining
and atomic energy. Under that mandate, OSHA formally promulgated an
initial package of standards upon coming officially into existence on April
28, 1971. 9 This package incorporated verbatim or by reference pertinent
standards previously adopted by such national consensus standards-setting
organizations as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA), and the American Society for Testing and
Materials (ASTM). There were also included standards derived from six other
existing federal acts.' 0
For the first two years of its existence, OSHA was authorized to promulgate
standards by rule alone." This procedure was designed to expedite develop-
ment and issuance of standards in the interest of providing the fastest and
broadest possible initial coverage of employees. Since April, 1973, standard
development has required a more deliberate procedure including, if OSHA
determines it to be pertinent, the appointment of advisory committees com-
posed of representatives of management, labor, safety and health professionals,
state agencies, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), and the public.' 2 Standards Advisory Committees have been estab-
lished for such areas as agriculture, construction, noise, and asbestos. OSHA
also can hold public hearings if requested by interested parties, who can either
appear personally or submit written statements.
The research and medical criteria needed to increase knowledge of the
causes and remedies for both safety and health hazards are to be provided by
NIOSH.'3 Among the responsibilities of that agency are safety and health
research, an annual listing of toxic substances (now numbering more than
15,000), and manpower development and training. Its most important re-
search is that which produces criteria for standards for toxic materials and
harmful physical agents. OSHA uses these criteria as a basis for proposing
standards. NIOSH is also involved in the compilation of safety and health
statistics, dissemination of technical information, and employer-employee
educational efforts.
The NIOSH research has assumed greater importance as OSHA has
focused on the exceedingly complex but critical task of identifying and elim-
ming are all engaged in encouraging employers and employees to comply voluntarily with OSHA's
standards.
'See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910, 1915-18, 1926 (1972). See generally id. §§ 1900-2200. These initial
standards were revised and updated late in 1972. See id. §§ 1910.1-.309, 1915.1-.111, 1926.1-
.57, 1926.100-.1051. Recently the standards were further clarified and updated. See 1 Occ.
SAFETY & HEALTH SUBSCRIPTION SERV., GENERAL INDUSTRY STANDARDS AND INTERPRETATION
change 1 (Sept. 27, 1973).
10 See Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act of 1936, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970); Service Contract
Act of 1965, 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-57 (1970); Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act, 40
U.S.C. §§ 327-33 (1970); Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act § 41, 33 U.S.C.§ 941 (1970),formerly ch. 509, § 41, 44 Stat. 1444 (1927); National Foundation on the Arts and
Humanities Act of 1965 § 50), 20 U.S.C. § 954(i) (1970); 5 U.S.C. § 7902 (1970) (mandating that
federal safety programs be instituted).
11 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 6(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1970).
12 Id. § 6(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1).
13Id. §§ 20, 22, 29 U.S.C. §§ 669, 671. NIOSH is a companion agency to OSHA within the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare.
644
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ROLE
inating toxic substances in ihe workplace. One of the main reasons for the
failure of previous private and governmental attempts at correcting this sit-
uation was their inability to grasp the scope of the problem. Both the number
and toxicity of thousands of substances used in the workplace were little un-
derstood. NIOSH has enabled OSHA to begin to understand the magnitude
of the task of identifying these hazards.
To recapitulate, regardless of the procedure used to set a particular stan-
dard, OSHA insists on the fullest possible participation by all interested parties,
particularly those directly affected. Not only does this provide an opportunity
for ventilating all opinions, it also assures standards that will be the most
accurate and practical for employee protection.
B. Enforcement of Standards: Inspection and
Citation Procedure
The current federal role in workplace protection is most clearly distin-
guished from previous governmental efforts by its enforcement capability.
The Act authorized OSHA compliance officers (inspectors) to make unan-
nounced inspections of virtually any establishment.14 The rationale for this
provision is that if employers received advance notice of an inspection, they
would tend to make cosmetic corrections of hazardous conditions, which re-
sult in no more than momentary protection for employees. Congress con-
sidered this possibility so serious that it wrote into the Act a requirement that
anyone giving advance notice of an inspection without authority from OSHA
will, if convicted, be fined up to $1,000, imprisoned for up to six months, or
both.15
Despite widespread erroneous allegations, OSHA inspectors cannot "im-
pose huge fines on the spot." Rather, the actual procedure for enforcing
standards begins with selection of establishments to be inspected in accordance
with a set of priorities, since OSHA could not possibly simultaneously inspect
every one of the five million establishments it covers.' 6 Before starting on
an assigned inspection, the compliance officer does his homework as to the
kind of workplace or product involved, the types of hazards he might expect
to find, and whether he will need certain types of equipment to test air, noise,
toxic substances, and so on.' 7 Upon entering the establishment, he presents
14 Id. § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 657(a).1 Id. § 17(f), 29 U.S.C. § 666(f).
16 The current priorities are: (1) situations of imminent danger in the workplace (the venting
of toxic fumes, an improperly shored construction trench, or excavation on the verge of collapse,
for example); (2) fatalities and catastrophies (which result in hospitalization of five or more em-
ployees); (3) valid employee complaints; (4) special emphasis programs such as the Target In-
dustry Program which involves five industries with injury frequency rates more than double
the national all-industry average (longshoring, roofing and sheet metal, lumber and wood products,
manufacture of miscellaneous transportation equipment such as mobile homes and snowmobiles,
and meat and meat packing), the Target Health Hazards Program which involves five of
the major toxic substances in industry (asbestos, carbon monoxide, cotton dust, lead, and silica),
and a program on cave-ins in construction trenching and excavation operations; and (5) random
selection of all types and sizes of establishments all over the country. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
ALL ABOUT OSHA: THE WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, WHY AND How OF THE OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, at 9 (OSHA Pub. No. 2056, 1973).
17 Id. at 11.
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his credentials, confers with the designated management representative re-
gardii-g the procedure and scope of the inspection, checks whether the OSHA
poster is displayed, looks over the establishment's safety and health record,
then asks that an employee representative join him and the management rep-
resentative on a walkaround inspection. At the subsequent closing conference,
the inspector informs the employer of what he has noted and asks the manager's
estimate of a reasonable time to abate any hazards. The inspector then returns
to his office and sends his report to his Area Director, who analyzes the informa-
tion and issues any citations and proposes any penalties.
OSHA cannot impose penalties, it can only propose them. If an employer
does not contest a citation and proposed penalty within the prescribed fifteen
working days, then the OSHA action becomes a final order of the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission. ' s If an employer does file a timely
notice of contest, then the case moves to the Review Commission, a wholly
independent three-member panel not associated with the Department of Labor
or OSHA.19 Before that point is reached, however, OSHA conducts informal
conferences with the employer in an effort to resolve problems (particularly
of employer misunderstanding or unawareness of various aspects of the Act
or the agency's implementation of it) in the interest of expediting worker pro-
tection through voluntary compliance.
When a case goes to the Review Commission (as have about five per cent of all
cases to date), it is assigned to an administrative law judge who sets a hearing
as near as possible to the employer's place of business. The employer need
not be represented by counsel, and many are not. If the employer or the Review
Commission is dissatisfied with the administrative law judge's decision, the
full three-member Commission will review the case. The Commission makes
its decision on the record of the case; it has held only two oral hearings since
its creation and has indicated it does not plan others. Should either the employer
or the Department desire, Review Commission decisions may be appealed to
a federal court of appeals.
To summarize, inspections have as their objective improved conditions
in the workplace. In part, this objective is obtained by a multiplier effect-an
inspection of an establishment in a particular industry will usually produce
voluntary compliance activity by other employers in that industry. This ripple
effect cannot be quantified, but its impact is apparent. For example, employers
in the nation expect to spend $3.03 billion to improve employee safety and
health in 1975, up eighteen per cent from the $2.6 billion invested in 1973.
By 1977, industry estimates it will be spending $3.44 billion, an increase which
cannot be wholly laid to inflation. 20 The ultimate value of an inspection thus
can be found not in its punitive effect, but rather in its deterrent effect. If
not faced with the possibility of an inspection, employers would lose much
of their motivation for achieving the goals of the Act.
,8 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1970).
19 Id. § 12, 29 U.S.C. § 661.20 D. GREENWALD, SECOND ANNUAL McGRAw-HILL SURVEY IN EMPLOYEE SAFETY AND HEALTH
(1974).
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II
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS A CATALYST
IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
A. The Roles of Labor and Management
In fulfilling the Act's directive to encourage employer and employee ef-
forts, OSHA has realized tangible results. Labor unions are instructing their
members on their rights and responsibilities under the law. Among the 116
unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO, for example, there are more than thirty-
five full-time safety and health directors and several others devoting at least
part of their time to this issue. Many of them were appointed after passage
of the Act. The Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO has created a
new Department of Health, Safety, and Environmental Affairs to supply in-
formation, research, and educational materials to the fifty-nine IUD-affiliated
unions, all of which have named at least a part-time safety and health director.
The United Steelworkers' summer institute now devotes several hours of each
day to instructing members on the law. Thirteen unions are cooperating with
OSHA in training courses developed under a contract with the University of
Wisconsin.
The business sector has initiated voluntary compliance efforts in many areas.
Trade associations are pinpointing relevant standards for their members;
several industries, such as telecommunications and textiles, have submitted
suggested standards governing workplace conditions in their member firms.
Larger industrial groups, such as the National Association of Manufacturers
and the United States Chamber of Commerce, have developed large-scale
informational efforts for their members.
One place where employer and employee activities come together is at
the collective bargaining table when safety and health provisions are included
in contracts. Such provisions have appeared frequently since the Act was signed.
The president of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union (AFL-CIO)
has stated that the Act helped make it possible for his union and the major
oil companies to deal effectively with job safety and health problems in that in-
dustry. In 1973, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the National
Automobile Transporters concluded an agreement to assure safe and healthy
employment conditions for employees in that field. Even more significant
was a contract signed in 1973 by the Chrysler Corporation and the United
Auto Workers (UAW). This agreement detailed specific measures to be taken
to protect the safety and health of UAW members employed by Chrysler. It
represented the first time in the history of the automobile industry that such
a comprehensive program had been negotiated. Similar contracts were con-
cluded by the UAW with the General Motors Corporation and the Ford Motor
Company.
B. OSHA Training Programs
OSHA also builds upon advances already made through employer-employee
initiative by formal and informal contacts with the public. These include sem-
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inars conducted by OSHA field personnel, speeches given by both national
office and field staff, numerous publications designed to aid employers and
employees in complying with the law, and cooperative programs with trade
associations and unions. Within OSHA's organization are many safety pro-
fessionals formerly employed by industry, who lend their expertise and ex-
perience to OSHA-industry cooperation.
Congress was aware of the paucity of trained specialists in occupational
safety and health, so it provided in the Act for training programs to increase
the number of such professionals. This resulted in the establishment of the
OSHA Training Institute near Chicago which instructs federal and state com-
pliance officers and offers free instruction to labor and industry represen-
tatives. The National Safety Council, under contract with OSHA, is providing
training for business establishments with fewer than 500 employees.
C. The Role of the States
One of the important and controversial components of the Act encourages
states to develop and administer their own occupational safety and health
programs.2 1 At issue is the historical position of the states in this area. The Act
was a response to state inadequacies, but if the states are willing and able to
assume responsibility for protection of their work force, the federal government
will aid them by example and by substantial funding. The key condition re-
quires that the states assure OSHA that their programs will be at least as ef-
fective as the federal program in providing safe and healthful places of em-
ployment. Eight criteria for approval are included in the law, mandating not
only standards which are as effective as federal standards, but also right of entry
for inspectors, a ban on advance notice of inspections, sufficient legal authority
for the enforcing agency, adequate funding, coverage of public employees
to the extent permitted by state law, and adequate reporting procedures.2 2
Opponents of state programs contend that the states historically proved
inadequate to the task and should remain precluded from responsibility for
workplace conditions. They advocate a complete federal presence throughout
the nation in workplace safety and health because the Act and OSHA's reg-
ulations regarding state plans provide insufficient protection for return of
this authority to the states.
These observers neglect the myriad advantages inherent in sharing this
program with the states. The enforcement effort is multiplied and remains
effective since the federal government, which pays fifty per cent of the oper-
ating costs of state programs, continues to monitor their effectiveness closely.
If at any time a state fails to comply with provisions of its approved plan, or
fails to make necessary changes as the federal-state partnership evolves, OSHA
can withdraw its approval. Additional advantages of a joint federal-state oc-
cupational safety and health effort include: the addition of state manpower
and funding, programs designed to suit the unique circumstances of workplace
conditions in individual states, an opportunity for the states to regain some
21 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 18, 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1970).
2 2 1d. § 18(c), 29 U.S.C. § 667(c).
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of the prerogatives lost to Washington in recent decades (providing a laboratory
for the effectiveness of governmental decentralization), and the only oppor-
tunity to protect employees of state and local governments since such employees
are otherwise excluded from the Act's coverage.
Forty-six states and other jurisdictions (such as the Virgin Islands,
Guam, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and the District of Columbia) have
submitted plans for resuming operation, twenty-six of which have been ap-
proved. Only six states have not submitted such proposals and four more have
withdrawn their plans.23 In those areas, full federal enforcement will continue
indefinitely.
D. Protection for Federal Employees
While the Act defines "employer" in terms excluding the federal govern-
ment,24 it also requires the head of each federal agency to establish a safety
and health program that is consistent with the OSHA program.25 In enforcing
the law, the federal government has been cognizant of its responsibility for
the physical well-being of its own employees. An Executive Order charges
each department and agency with the responsibility of establishing an occupa-
tional safety and health program consistent with standards prescribed for
the private sector. 26 A Federal Advisory Council on Occupational Safety and
Health was established by the Order to advise the Secretary of Labor.27 OSHA
provides guidance to the agencies, evaluates their safety and health efforts,
collects job injury and illness statistics, and reports annually to the President.
As a result of promotional activities under OSHA's aegis thus far, the injury
incidence rate among federal civilian employees has decreased materially.
E. The Role of Workmen's Compensation
The final expression of the stimulative effect of the Act is the growing
improvement in state workmen's compensation benefits. Although OSHA does
not administer the federal government's activities in this field, the problem
of workmen's compensation is inextricably intertwined with the activities
delegated to OSHA by the Act. The National Commission on State Workmen's
Compensation Laws, which was created by the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, submitted a report in 1972 proposing more than eighty improve-
ments in state laws designed to compensate victims of industrial accidents
23 Approved plans are those of Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virgin Islands,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. States that have withdrawn proposed plans are Georgia,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania. Plans have not been submitted by Kansas,
Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota, and the Trust Territories of the Pacific. OSHA has
initiated action to reject the Virginia plan.
24 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 3(5), 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1970).
2, Id. § 19(a), 29 U.S.C. § 668(a).
26 Exec. Order No. 11612, 3 C.F.R. 343 (1973).
27 The Council is composed of fifteen members and includes representatives of federal agencies
and labor organizations representing personnel of these agencies.
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or illness.2 8 These recommendations dealt with employee coverage, full med-
ical and rehabilitative services, adequate weekly benefit levels, and elimination
of arbitrary limits on the total amount or duration of benefits. The states were
to be given an opportunity to improve their laws, but compliance with the
essential recommendations of the Commission was to be evaluated in 1975.
The Commission asked Congress to take action if the recommendations were
not implemented by that time.
As a result of these recommendations, a number of states have completed
comprehensive revisions of their workmen's compensation laws. Five have
changed their programs from elective to compulsory in nature. Exemptions
of small firms based on number of employees have been eliminated or reduced
in eight, and several have extended their coverage of agricultural workers.
Full coverage of occupational disease was provided for the first time in five
states. Finally, most states have liberalized their maximum weekly benefit pro-
visions, and several have reduced the waiting period before benefits become
payable.2 9
CONCLUSION
The provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and the
manner in which they have been implemented indicate that the federal govern-
ment is serving as a catalyst in developing public awareness of the problem
of workplace hazards as well as methods for its solution. The key question for
carrying out this legislation is: how can the potential of a hazard-free work
environment be maximized without creating an overbearing federal presence?
The approach described throughout this paper provides the Administration's
answer.
If the federal government were to view its role as that of an enforcement
mechanism alone, those to be protected by such inclusive legislation would be
ill-served. The tragedy of on-the-job deaths, injuries, and illnesses is too com-
plex to be eliminated through inspections, citations, and penalties alone. An
adequate solution requires a multifaceted approach involving enforcement,
research, voluntary compliance, and assistance from the states. Only through
the involvement of federal and state governments, private industry, the labor
movement, occupational safety and health professionals, the medical profes-
sion, and every other segment of society affected by this problem can it be
placed in its proper frame of reference-a complex, diversely-manifested
social pathology with myriad causes.
"SSee NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, THE REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 13-27 (1972).29 Johnson, Changes in Workmen's Compensation Laws in 1973, 97 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Jan.
1974, at 32.
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